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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
When the district court in Cassidy H. Stone's felony battery on a health care worker case
granted the State's motion in limine to exclude certain evidence, the district court noted, "this
ruling does not prohibit the Defendant from introducing relevant character evidence, such as the
Defendant's general reputation for peacefulness, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)."
However, the district court later excluded evidence of Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness,
because battery was a general intent crime and the character trait of peacefulness was therefore
not relevant. In this appeal, Ms. Stone asserts the district court erred when it excluded evidence
of her character for peacefulness, because that character trait was relevant to whether Ms. Stone
had the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Stone by Information with battery on a health care worker.
(R., pp.28-29.) The Information alleged Ms. Stone "did commit a battery on Sarah Gonzales, a
person licensed, certified or registered by the State of Idaho to provide health care, or an
employee of a hospital, medical clinic or medical practice, where Sarah Gonzales was engaged in
the course of performing her duties or because of the victim's professional or employment status
by kicking Sarah Gonzales .... " (R., pp.28-29.) Ms. Stone entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.36.)
Later, the State filed a Motion in Limine to exclude various items, including, "Any
reference to the fact that the defendant does not have a criminal history or has led a law abiding
life." (R., pp.43-44.) At a hearing on the motion in limine, Ms. Stone asserted, "the defendant is
allowed to introduce character evidence in the form ofreputation or opinion." (Tr. 3/27/19, p.7,
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Ls.6-10.) Ms. Stone objected to the requested exclusion "to the extent that we do intend to
possibly offer character evidence." (Tr. 3/27/19, p.7, Ls.20-22.)
The district court granted the State's motion in limine, "with the caveat that Defendant's
right to present pertinent character evidence under Idaho Rules of Evidence 404(a)(2) and 405
are not affected by this ruling." (R., pp.65-73.) The court determined Ms. Stone's lack of
criminal history and the fact that she led a law abiding life "were not relevant to the elements of
battery on a health care worker and they do not make it more or less probable that Defendant did
or did not commit a battery on Ms. Gonzales," and excluded that evidence. (R., p.68.) The
district court continued:

"However, this court notes that this ruling does not prohibit the

Defendant from introducing relevant character evidence, such as the Defendant's general
reputation for peacefulness, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)." (R., p.68.)
After opening statements at Ms. Stone's jury trial, the State brought a motion to have the
district court "consider excluding any character evidence in this case, because battery is a general
intent crime and there's no relevance to character evidence because of that." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.108,
Ls.6-13.) Ms. Stone asked the court to allow the character evidence in, because it would be in
compliance with Idaho Rule of Evidence 404. (Tr. 4/3/19, p.109, Ls.15-23.) She indicated that
in State v. Dobbins, 102 Idaho 706 (1981) (per curiam), the defendant had introduced evidence
of character for peacefulness and non-violence, and the Idaho Supreme Court "was kind of
saying, well, we don't go into specific acts, we only talk about general reputation."

(See

Tr. 4/3/19, p.109, L.24-p.110, L.16.)
Ms. Stone believed "that testimony about Miss Stone's character for peacefulness, nonviolence, not violent, not quarrelsome is relevant to the issue of intent in this case; specifically,
to show that in line with our defense, Miss Stone did not intend to kick Miss Gonzales .... "
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(Tr. 4/3/19, p.110, Ls.17-23.) She asserted, "it's relevant because it would tend to show the jury
that Miss Stone would have acted in conformity with her character and wouldn't have intended
to kick Miss Gonzales." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.110, L.23 -p.111, L.2.) Ms. Stone had multiple character
witnesses, with one ready to testify that day. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.111, Ls.11-16.)
The State argued one of the three ways to commit a battery only required willfulness, and
Ms. Stone responded that in State v. Billings, 137 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2002), "the Court
specifically lays out that the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to touch, strike, kick the alleged victim." (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.111, L.20 - p.113, L.7.)
She asserted, "So whether we call it a general intent crime or not, I don't know, but it is clear
that the State does have to prove Miss Stone had the intent to strike Miss Gonzales." (Tr. 4/3/19,
p.113, Ls.9-12.) Ms. Stone asserted, "this character evidence is relevant to show that, no, she
didn't have that intent, because that's not-that's not what her character is .... " (Tr. 4/3/19,
p.113, Ls.12-15.)
The district court quoted Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(a) for the applicable standards on
when a defendant may introduce character evidence in a criminal case. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.113,
L.24 - p.114, L.9.) Next, the court discussed State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941 (Ct. App. 1990).
(See Tr. 4/3/19, p.114, L.13 - p.115, L.1.) According to the district court, in Bailey: "A person

was charged with a DUI, and the defendant wanted to offer evidence of his character for
moderate drinking habits. But the Court said it's not relevant to the case at hand, because it
showed his propensity to drink only in moderation." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.115, Ls.2-7.) The Bailey
Court held a defendant did not need to drink excessively to be convicted of DUI, but only needed
to have consumed alcohol which impaired the defendant's ability to drive.

(See Tr. 4/3/19,

p.115, Ls.7-11.) Thus, a person who was only a moderate drinker could still be guilty of DUI,
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and the Bailey Court held that moderation in drinking was not relevant to the elements of the
cnme. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.115, Ls.11-15.)
The district court also discussed State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125 (Ct. App. 2013), where
the Court of Appeals held that the term "pertinent" in Rule 404(a) was generally synonymous
with "relevant." (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.115, L.16 - p.116, L.14.) Additionally, the court noted that
the Court of Appeals in State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 2000), had held that battery
was a general intent crime. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.116, L.15 -p.117, L.9.) The district court thought
that was significant because the battery on a health care worker statute referred to the battery
statute. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.117, Ls. I 0-16.) Based on its review of those and other cases, the
district court did not see "anything that indicates that this battery is a specific intent crime. I
think it is a general intent crime .... " (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.120, Ls.16-21.)
The district court stated: "So we are dealing with a general intent crime, and so then let's
get to the actual analysis: Does a person's character for peacefulness or non-violence, is it
relevant to an element of the battery in this particular case? And I don't think it is." (Tr. 4/3/19,
p.120, L.23 - p.121, L.3.) The district court determined, "I think, like the defendant in Bailey, if
that's the DUI case, while it has that seeming connection to it, someone can be a peaceful person
and still commit a battery on a healthcare individual by doing, as in this case, what Miss Stone is
accused of doing." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, Ls.3-8.)
The district court had also considered that "the defense that I'm hearing sounds like
accident." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, Ls.9-12.) The district court thought that Ms. Stone had "offered an
accident instruction that, you know, there's no intent-that this was an accident, that we don't
have the requisite intent here, and so, you know, whether general or specific or whatever, and so
that would be a defense." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, Ls.12-17.) However, the district court determined:
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"But character for peacefulness definitely does not, in the Court's mind, go to accident.
Something can-particularly if what you're claiming is there's no intent, then the peacefulness,
if anything, would go to intent. If anything." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, Ls.18-22.) Thus, the district
court agreed "that the character for peacefulness offered by other witnesses is not relevant to the
elements of battery of a healthcare worker. That also refers to, you know, the definitions of
battery in 18-903. So I would exclude that evidence." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, L.23 -p.122, L.3.)
Sarah Gonzales, a registered nurse at Kootenai Health's emergency department,
testified that she was training a new nurse when she had contact with Ms. Stone. (See Tr. 4/3/19,
p.124, L. 7 - p.128, L.24.) Ms. Stone was in a room used for protective custody patients, and she
was trying to leave the room while other hospital personnel were trying to keep her from leaving.
(See Tr. 4/3/19, p.128, L.25 - p.130, L.3.)

Ms. Gonzales tried to explain the situation to

Ms. Stone, and felt Ms. Stone was unsteady on her feet and needed to be on a gurney so she
would be safe. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.130, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Gonzales testified she was trying to instruct
Ms. Stone to sit on the gurney, and Ms. Stone was refusing to do that. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.130,
Ls.8-11.)

When asked if she saw any signs of intoxication, Ms. Gonzales answered that

Ms. Stone was very unsteady on her feet and not very rational.

(Tr. 4/3/19, p.133, Ls.5-7.)

Ms. Stone made threats of violence towards Ms. Gonzales and other hospital personnel, and told
them she wanted to leave. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.133, Ls.13-23.)
Ms. Gonzales then testified that she spent a couple minutes trying to convince Ms. Stone
that she needed to lay down, but Ms. Stone continued to refuse to cooperate. (See Tr. 4/3/19,
p.134, Ls.8-13.) When Ms. Stone would not get into the bed, Ms. Gonzales and the other
hospital staff picked her up and put her on the gurney.

(See Tr. 4/3/19, p.134, Ls.13-21.)

Ms. Gonzales testified that Ms. Stone thrashed around on the gurney, pulled her knees up to her
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chest, and then "she kicked me in the face." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.135, Ls.4-9.) Ms. Gonzales testified
Ms. Stone hit her in the face twice with her feet, hard enough to throw her off balance. (See
Tr. 4/3/19, p.136, Ls.4-10.) Afterwards, Ms. Gonzales and other hospital personnel restrained
Ms. Stone on the gurney and sedated her. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.137, Ls.3-9.)
Officer Christopher Schatz with the Coeur d'Alene Police Department testified that he
was in the room in the emergency department with Ms. Stone and the hospital personnel. (See
Tr. 4/3/19, p.169, L.12- p.170, L.14.) Officer Schatz testified, "The staff eventually had to slide
her backwards toward the bed, sitting off the edge, at which point she rolled on her back, kicking
her legs up, striking one of the nurses in the face." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.171, Ls.6-9.) On crossexamination, the officer testified it did not appear Ms. Stone was trying to get up out of the bed,
because it looked more like her legs were being directed at someone, rather than trying to roll
back onto her feet. (Tr. 4/3/19, p.179, L.25 - p.180, L.7.) On redirect examination, Officer
Schatz testified it looked like Ms. Stone's legs were directed at someone because they were
pushed outwards, towards where the staff were standing. (Tr. 4/3/19, p.182, Ls.5-11.)
Kody Wright, a lead security officer at Kootenai Health, testified that Ms. Stone was
initially very complaint but rapidly became non-compliant, and the nursing staff was trying to
explain the boundaries of the protective custody hold and that she could not leave.

(See

Tr. 4/4/19, p.231, Ls.1-24.) He testified that when the hospital personnel tried to lift Ms. Stone
onto the bed, "she essentially rolled onto her back and started kicking directly at Nurse
Gonzales." (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.232, Ls.11-18.) Mr. Wright testified, based on his review of the
video, that Ms. Stone kicked directly at Ms. Gonzales three times, making contact twice.
(Tr. 4/4/19, p.232, L.19 - p.233, L.23.) The State published to the jury video footage from
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Officer Schatz's body camera and a camera in the room. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.282, Ls.16-25; Exs. 1
&2.)
On the second day of the jury trial, Ms. Stone requested "to be allowed to present
character evidence on Miss Stone's character for peacefulness or non-violence or lack of
quarrelsomeness," under Rule 404(a)(2). (Tr. 4/4/19, p.193, Ls.18-22.) Ms. Stone asserted that,
under Rule 404(a)(2), "the evidence just has to be generally relevant to the charge." (Tr. 4/4/19,
p.194, Ls.16-17.)

She also noted that "a defendant is allowed under 404(a)(2) to introduce

evidence as to a victim's reputation or character for violence or quarrelsomeness or aggression."
(Tr. 4/419, p.195, Ls.17-22.) Ms. Stone agreed that whether a defendant is peaceful would not
prove an element of the crime, but asserted that her "reputation for peacefulness is generally
relevant to the offense charged." (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.196, L.10 - p.197, L.3.) She asserted, "It
shows if she's generally a peaceful person, it's more likely that she acted in accordance with her
character on this occasion, which is precisely what we're trying to argue, that she did not intend
to strike that nurse." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.197, Ls.4-8.) Additionally, she asserted, "in a battery case,
where a victim, a defendant is peaceful, is violent is pertinent to the charge." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.198,
Ls.11-14.) She emphasized the character evidence on peacefulness would be limited to opinion
or reputation evidence, and she would not be going into specific instances of conduct. (See
Tr. 4/4/19, p.200, L.19-p.201, L.6.)
In response to the State's argument that the district court had previously made the right
decision because battery was a general intent crime, Ms. Stone responded that, "in order for the
battery to be committed, the defendant has to have the intent to strike a person." (See Tr. 4/4/19,
p.201, L.10 - p.203, L.21.) She asserted, "what this character evidence goes to show is that
Miss Stone did not have that intent, she acted in conformity with her character for peacefulness,
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and thus, it's less likely, which, again, is all that's required for relevance, it makes something
more or less likely." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.203, L.25 - p.204, L.6.) Ms. Stone asserted: "If she's a
peaceful person, it's less likely that she would intend to strike someone on a particular occasion.
It would make it more likely that any striking was an accident." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.204, Ls.6-9.)
The district court stated:

"So I'm not hearing anything that convinces me that my

decision was wrong. I don't disagree with the premise that character evidence can be admissible
in the way that the rule says, in the way that [defense counsel] cited, but that isn't the specific
issue before the Court in this case with respect to a general intent crime." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.208,
Ls.15-21.) The district court determined, "I'm going to stand on the ruling that we made," and
denied Ms. Stone's motion. (Tr. 4/4/19, p.209, Ls.5-13.)
Ms. Stone testified in her own defense that the last thing she remembered from the day of
the incident was drawing a bath at her house, taking her prescription Ambien, and drinking some
wine. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.286, Ls.18-25.) She did not remember any of the time she was in the
hospital on the date of the incident. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.287, Ls.1-3.) On cross-examination, she
testified that she became intoxicated and blacked out from the Ambien and wine. (Tr. 4/4/19,
p.293, Ls.3-9.) Based on her review of the video, Ms. Stone thought she was not kicking at
Ms. Gonzales' face, but was kicking to get momentum to get off the bed. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.300,
L.22 - p.301, L.1.) When the State asked her, "So you believe you're responsible for kicking her
in the face," she replied, "Yes, by accident." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.301, Ls.15-17.)
The district court gave the jury Ms. Stone's requested jury instruction, that "All persons
are capable of committing crimes, except those who committed the act or made the omissions
charged through misfortune or by accident when it appears that there was not evil design,
intention or culpable negligence." (R., p.128; see Tr. 4/4/19, p.310, L.21 - p.314, L.7, p.326,
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L.25 - p.327, L.4.) In closing arguments, the State argued that the only disputed element "is,
was there a battery, did a battery happen." (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.331, L.23 - p.332, L.11.) The State
elected to pursue two of the three possible ways to commit a battery, "that being whether there
was a willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon Miss Gonzales, or whether there was
actually, intentionally, and unlawfully touching or striking of Miss Gonzales against her will."
(See Tr. 4/4/19, p.332, L.20 - p.333, L.3.) The State told the jury it had to decide whether

Ms. Stone kicked Ms. Gonzales "in the face on purpose." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.333, Ls.14-16.)
The jury found Ms. Stone guilty of battery on a health care worker. (R., p.136.) The
district court imposed a unified sentence of two years, with one year fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Ms. Stone on supervised probation for a period of two years. (R., pp.14650.) Ms. Stone filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court Judgment of Conviction Suspended Execution. (R., pp.154-57; see R., pp.164-67 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it excluded evidence on Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness,
because that character trait was relevant to whether Ms. Stone had the requisite culpable state of
mind to commit a battery?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Excluded Evidence On Ms. Stone's Character For
Peacefulness, Because That Character Trait Was Relevant To Whether Ms. Stone Had The
Requisite Culpable State Of Mind To Commit A Battery

A.

Introduction
Ms. Stone asserts the district court erred when it excluded evidence on her character for

peacefulness, because that character trait was relevant to whether she had the requisite culpable
state of mind to commit a battery. The character evidence would make it less likely that she had
the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery. Reputation or opinion evidence that
Ms. Stone had a character trait for peacefulness would make it less likely that she purposely used
force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales' body, or that she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales.
Thus, Ms. Stone's character trait of peacefulness was pertinent, or relevant, to the battery on a
health care worker charge by making the material fact of her requisite culpable state of mind less
probable. The district court erred when it excluded this character evidence, and its reasons for
excluding the evidence were incorrect. The State will be unable to meet its burden of proving
the district court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question oflaw that an appellate court reviews de novo.

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013).
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C.

Evidence On Ms. Stone's Character For Peacefulness Was Relevant To Whether She Had
The Requisite Culpable State Of Mind To Commit A Battery
Ms. Stone asserts evidence on her character for peacefulness was relevant to whether she

had the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery. Evidence is relevant if "it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence," and "the
fact is of consequence in determining the action." I.R.E. 401(a) & (b). The Idaho Rules of
Evidence provide: "Relevant evidence is admissible unless these rules, or other rules applicable
in the courts of this state, provide otherwise. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." I.RE. 402.
Generally, "Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait."
I.R.E. 404(a)(l).

However, in a criminal case, "a defendant may offer evidence of the

defendant's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it." I.R.E. 404(a)(l)(A). A defendant in a criminal case may also "offer evidence of an
alleged victim's pertinent trait of character, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may
offer evidence to rebut it." I.R.E. 404(a)(l)(B).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held: "In this context, the word 'pertinent' is generally
synonymous with 'relevant.' Thus, a pertinent character trait is one that is relevant to the crime
charged by making any material fact more or less probable." State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125,
130 (Ct. App. 2013). In Rothwell, the Court also held, "It follows that the district court was
incorrect in holding that a trait of character is pertinent and admissible under I.R.E. 404(a)(l)
only if that trait is an element of the offense or of a defense to the charge." Id.
Typically, "When evidence of a person's character or character trait is admissible, it may
be proved by testimony about the person's reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.
On cross-examination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant
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specific instances of the person's conduct."

LR.E. 405(a).

"When a person's character or

character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the character or trait may
also be proved by relevant specific instances of the person's conduct." LR.E. 405(b ).

1.

Ms. Stone's Character Trait For Peacefulness Was Relevant To Battery On A
Health Care Worker, Because It Would Make It Less Likely That She Had The
Requisite Culpable Mental State To Commit A Battery

Here, Ms. Stone's character trait for peacefulness was relevant to the crime charged,
battery on a health care worker, because it would make it less likely that she had the requisite
culpable mental state to commit a battery. The battery on a health care worker statute, LC. § 18915C, provides:
Any person who commits battery as defined in section 18-903, Idaho Code,
against or upon any person licensed, certified or registered by the state of Idaho to
provide health care, or an employee of a hospital, medical clinic or medical
practice, when the victim is in the course of performing his or her duties or
because of the victim's professional or employment status under this statute, shall
be subject to imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed three (3) years.
As the State argued before the district court, the only disputed element of battery on a
health care worker was whether Ms. Stone committed a battery. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.331, L.23 p.332, L.11.) LC. § 18-903 defines battery as any "(a) Willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another;" or "(b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or
striking of another person against the will of the other;" or "( c) Unlawfully and intentionally
causing bodily harm to an individual." The State here elected not to pursue subsection (c) as
how Ms. Stone committed a battery, leaving the other two subsections of Section 18-903 at issue.
Put otherwise, the State argued that Ms. Stone committed a battery either by willful and unlawful
use of force or violence upon the person of Ms. Gonzales, or by actual, intentional and unlawful
touching or striking of Ms. Gonzales against her will. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.332, L.20 - p.333, L.3.)
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Thus, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Stone had the requisite
culpable state of mind to commit a battery.

The Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "As to

subsection (a), the culpable state of mind is specified to be 'willful."' State v. Billings, 137
Idaho 827, 830 (Ct. App. 2002). "Willfully," under the statutory definitions, "when applied to
the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to
commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or
to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." LC. § 18-101(1)). The Billings Court also
explained, "The 'act referred to' in the definition of battery under subsection (a) of§ 18-903 is
the 'use of force or violence upon the person of another."' Billings, 137 Idaho at 830. The Court
held, "Thus, proof of a violation of subsection (a) requires a showing that the accused purposely
used force or violence upon the victim's body." Id.

"Although it is not necessary that the

defendant know that the act is illegal or intend that is cause bodily injury, it is necessary that the
defendant intend a forceful or violent contact with the other person." Id.
As for subsection (b ), the Billings Court held, "the requisite culpable state of mind is
intent." Id. "In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act
and intent, or criminal negligence." LC. § 18-114. The Billings Court noted, "This intent is 'not
an intent to commit a crime, but is merely the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted
act .... "' Billings, 137 Idaho at 830 (quoting State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 78 (1957)) (citing
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 934, 926 (1993); State v. Nasta.ff, 124 Idaho 667, 670 (Ct. App. 1993)).

The interdicted act in the defmition of battery under Section 18-903(b) is "touching or striking of
another person against the will of the other." Id. The Court held, "It follows that a conviction
for violation of subsection (b) requires proof of intent to touch or strike another person." Id.
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Here, the State was therefore required to either show that Ms. Stone purposely used force
or violence upon Ms. Gonzales' body, or that Ms. Stone intended to touch or strike
Ms. Gonzales. See id. Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness was relevant to this culpable state
of mind element of battery.
As the district court recognized, there is not much direct guidance in Idaho case law on
whether character for peacefulness is a pertinent character trait in a battery criminal case. (See
Tr. 4/4/19, p.207, Ls.13-24.)

However, the district court named "the Defendant's general

reputation for peacefulness" as an example of relevant character evidence under Rule 404(a)(2),
in its order granting the State's motion in limine. (R., p.68.)
Before the district court, Ms. Stone indicated evidence of a defendant's reputation for
peacefulness had been addressed in State v. Dobbins, 102 Idaho 706 (1981) (per curiam). (See
Tr. 4/3/19, p.109, L.24 - p.110, L.16.) In Dobbins, an aggravated assault and battery case, the
defendant "sought to introduce evidence of reputation for peacefulness, nonviolence, truthfulness
and veracity through the testimony" of another witness. See Dobbins, 102 Idaho at 707. In
attempting to lay a foundation for the witness's testimony, the defendant asked the witness "to
name some of the individuals who made up the community from which he was going to testify as
to the reputation of Dobbins." Id. The magistrate judge sustained the State's objection to the
question. Id. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court observed, "It is well settled that
a criminal defendant may offer evidence of his good reputation for the character trait(s) involved
in the particular crime he is charged with as proof of the unlikelihood that he committed the
crime." Id. "The criminal defendant's proof, however, must be limited to his general reputation
in the community." Id.
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The Dobbins Court then stated, "what was supposed to be testimony as to the general
reputation of a defendant, by inference would have become testimony as to the defendant's
reputation among the named individuals."

Id.

The Court held, "the district court aptly

concluded that 'to allow such testimony could have opened the door to discussion of the
credibility of the particular persons involved and specific acts or instances of conduct, which
could unduly prolong the trial by introduction of unnecessary collateral issues."' Id. Thus, the
Dobbins Court held the magistrate did not err in sustaining the State's objection. Id.

The Dobbins Court did not hold the defendant's character evidence as to his reputation
for peacefulness and non-violence was also inadmissible; however, the State in Dobbins did not
object to the defendant's use of such general character evidence. See id.

Further, Dobbins

predates the 1985 adoption of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856,
858 (Ct. App. 1992).
Turning to persuasive authorities, courts in some other jurisdictions have held that a
defendant's character trait of peacefulness is relevant to a battery criminal case. For example, in
State v. Faafiti, 513 P.2d 697 (Haw. 1973), an aggravated battery case, the defendant argued that

the trial court erred in refusing to permit a witness "to give any testimony concerning the
defendant's character, particularly as to a trait of peacefulness or as to a non-violent
temperament." Faafiti, 513 P.2d at 701. The Hawaii Supreme Court in Faafiti acknowledged
that the defendant "has a clear right to introduce evidence of personal character traits associated
with the basic nature of the offense with which he is charged." Id. The Court then held, "In
defending against a charge of aggravated battery, evidence of peaceful and non-violent character
is obviously of the greatest relevance." Id.; see also State v. Ervin, 451 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah
1969) (holding, in an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery case, that "[ a]s
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to the crime here charged, which involved both stealing and violence, the jury should not have
been precluded from considering the traits of honesty and integrity, nor of being peaceable and
law abiding, which are included in general good character").
Similarly, in Seabrook v. State, 348 So.2d 663 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) (per curiam), the
appellant appealed "the trial court's refusal to allow him to present evidence as to his reputation
for peacefulness and tranquility at his trial for aggravated battery in which he was ultimately
found guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated assault." Seabrook, 348 So.2d at 663. The
majority of the Florida Second District Court of Appeal panel in Seabrook stated, "The general
rule in Florida is that a criminal defendant may introduce evidence of his good character and
reputation where such evidence has reference to a trait involved in the offense with which he is
charged." Id. at 664. The Seabrook majority held, "Certainly one's lack of propensity toward
violence is relevant to the trait of violence inherent in the commission of an aggravated battery or
aggravated assault; so the trial court's refusal to allow testimony as to appellant's reputation with
respect to that trait was error." Id. Further, the majority held, "it was reversible error in this case
because such evidence was clearly corroborative of appellant's defense of accident and tended to
negate the very heart of an essential element of the offense charged, to wit: an intentional threat
of violence." Id. 1
Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), like its Idaho counterpart, provides that a
defendant in a criminal case "may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and if the
evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it." Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A).
Some works on federal practice recognize that a defendant's character trait of peacefulness is
1

The dissenting judge in Seabrook agreed "that a defendant on trial for a crime of violence may
introduce evidence of his reputation for peace and tranquility in the community," but would have
affirmed the conviction on other grounds. See Seabrook, 348 So.2d at 664-65 (Scheb,
J., dissenting.)
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relevant to a battery in a criminal case.

Michael H. Graham, 3 Handbook of Federal

Evidence§ 405:1 (8 th ed., Nov. 2019 update) ("Peacefulness is the relevant character trait for a
person charged with assault and battery."); Robert E. Larsen, Navigating the Federal
Trial § 10: 15 (2019 ed.) ("For example, a defendant's character for peaceableness would be
relevant to a criminal charge of assault and battery.").
In a related Idaho context, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, "in a case
involving battery, a defendant can offer reputation or opinion evidence about the victim's
character trait for violence to show the victim was the initial aggressor or that the force used
against the victim was necessary for self-protection." Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33, 38 (2017).
As Ms. Stone indicated before the district court, if Rule 404(a) allows a defendant in a battery
criminal case to present evidence on the alleged victim's character trait for violence, it should
likewise allow evidence of the defendant's own character trait for peacefulness or nonviolence.
(See Tr. 4/4/19, p.196, Ls.2-9.)
In light of the above, evidence of Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness was relevant to
whether she had the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery. Reputation or opinion
evidence that Ms. Stone had a character trait for peacefulness or non-violence would make it less
likely that she purposely used force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales' body. See I.C. § 18-903(a).
Likewise, reputation or opinion evidence on her character for peacefulness would make it less
likely that she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales.

See I.C. § l 8-903(b).

Thus,

Ms. Stone's character trait of peacefulness was pertinent, or relevant, to the battery on a health
care worker charge by making the material fact of her requisite culpable state of mind less
probable. See Rothwell, 154 Idaho at 130. The character evidence would make it less likely that
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she had the requisite culpable mental state to commit a battery. The evidence of Ms. Stone's
character of peacefulness was admissible under Rule 404(a)(l).

2.

The District Court's Reasons For Excluding The Character Evidence
Were Incorrect

The district court's reasons for excluding the character evidence were incorrect. The
district court determined that the evidence of Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness was not
relevant, because battery, and by extension battery on a health care worker, were general intent
crimes. (See Tr. 4/3/19, p.120, L.23 - p.121, L.8; Tr. 4/4/19, p.205, L.15 - p.209, L.8.) The
Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is
shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent
requirement refers to the state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof."
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691 (Ct. App. 2008). "In other words, specific intent requires not

only the doing of an act, but the performance of that act with the intent to cause the proscribed
result." Id.
In State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals expressly
held that the form of battery in Section 18-903(a), "in Idaho, is a general intent crime." Carlson,
134 Idaho at 400. The Carlson Court also concluded that aggravated battery, "like battery, is a
general intent crime." See id.
However, the fact that battery is a general intent crime in Idaho does not support the
district court's determination that character evidence for peacefulness is irrelevant in this battery
on a health care worker case. Rule 404(a) does not differentiate between specific intent and
general intent offenses. See I.R.E. 404(a). Further, even if the State here did not have to prove
that Ms. Stone intended to commit a crime, the State still had to prove that Ms. Stone had the
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requisite culpable state of mind for battery. See Billings, 137 Idaho at 830. The State was
required to either show that Ms. Stone purposely used force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales'
body, or that Ms. Stone intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales. See id. As demonstrated
above, evidence of Ms. Stone's character trait for peacefulness would make it less likely that she
had the requisite culpable state of mind.
In its analysis, the district court also determined, "I think, like the defendant in Bailey, if
that's the DUI case, while it has that seeming connection to it, someone can be a peaceful person
and still commit a battery on a healthcare individual by doing, as in this case, what Miss Stone is
accused of doing." (Tr. 4/3/19, p.121, Ls.3-8.) However, the relevancy inquiry is not whether
somebody could have the character trait and still commit the offense. Rather, the proper inquiry
is whether the character evidence is relevant, or pertinent, by making any material fact more or
less probable. See Rothwell, 154 Idaho at 130.
Additionally, the district court incorrectly determined that the reasonmg of State v.
Bailey, 117 Idaho 941 (Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam), was applicable here. In Bailey, a DUI case,

the Court of Appeals wrote: "Generally, criminal defendants are allowed to present evidence of
a pertinent character trait to prove that they engaged in lawful conduct.

For example, one

charged with theft could offer evidence of honesty." Bailey, 117 Idaho at 942 (citation omitted).
The Bailey Court also stated, "However, such evidence cannot be admitted unless it is relevant to
the elements of the crime charged." Id.
The defendant in Bailey argued "that evidence concerning his moderate drinking habits
was relevant to the case at hand because it showed his propensity to drink only in moderation."
Id. at 943. The Court stated: "However, a defendant need not drink excessively to be convicted

of driving under the influence.

He need only be shown to have consumed alcohol, which
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perceptibly impaired his ability to drive." Id. Thus, the Court held that "a defendant who is only
a moderate drinker may nevertheless be guilty of violating" the DUI statute, and "moderation in
drinking is not relevant to the elements of the crime of driving under the influence." Id. The

Bailey Court assumed that the witness would have testified that the defendant was a moderate
drinker as opposed to a complete abstainer, and the Court therefore did not "believe the proffered
testimony tended to disprove the elements of the charged offense." See id.

Bailey is distinguishable from the present case because the proffered evidence there, on
the defendant's character trait for moderate drinking, would not have made it less likely that he
was impaired. See id. Conversely, evidence on Ms. Stone's character trait for peacefulness or
non-violence would make it less likely that she had the requisite culpable state of mind for a
battery. This is especially true considering one of the ways Ms. Stone allegedly committed the
battery was through the purposeful use of force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales' body.
I.C. § 18-903(a).

See

Thus, the evidence of Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness, unlike the

character evidence in Bailey, would tend to disprove one of the elements of the charged offense
here. 2
In sum, evidence on Ms. Stone's character for peacefulness was relevant to whether she
had the requisite culpable state of mind to commit a battery. Reputation or opinion evidence that
Ms. Stone had a character trait for peacefulness would make it less likely that she purposely used
force or violence upon Ms. Gonzales' body, or that she intended to touch or strike Ms. Gonzales.
Thus, Ms. Stone's character trait of peacefulness was pertinent, or relevant, to the battery on a
health care worker charge by making the material fact of her requisite culpable state of mind less

2

Also, the Bailey Court wrote, "Whether evidence is relevant is a question directed to the trial
court's sound discretion." Bailey, 117 Idaho at 942. It is well-established that an appellate court
reviews questions ofrelevance de novo. E.g., Joy, 155 Idaho at 6.
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probable.

See Rothwell, 154 Idaho at 130.

The evidence of Ms. Stone's character of

peacefulness was admissible under Rule 404(a)(l), and the district court erred when it excluded
the evidence.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows

that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To

hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Ms. Stone asserts the State will be unable to meet its burden of proving the district
court's error in excluding the evidence on her character for peacefulness was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The crucial issue in this case was whether Ms. Stone had the requisite

culpable state of mind to commit a battery on Ms. Gonzales. As discussed above, the State told
the jury in closing argument that the only disputed element was whether a battery happened, and
that the jury had to decide whether Ms. Stone kicked Ms. Gonzales "in the face on purpose."
(See Tr. 4/4/19, p.332, Ls.3-11, p.333, Ls.10-17.)

Ms. Stone testified that, although she did not remember the incident, she thought she had
kicked Ms. Gonzales by accident. (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.287, Ls.1-3, p.301, Ls.15-17.) In closing
arguments, Ms. Stone asserted she was not trying to kick Ms. Gonzales, and the kicking of
Ms. Gonzales "was an accident." (Tr. 4/4/19, p.344, Ls.21-24.) During its rebuttal, the State
argued that, because there was evidence Ms. Stone had kicked at Ms. Gonzales' face multiple
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times, "she was certainly intending to do that. You can come to no other conclusion. There is no
doubt in this case that what she did was on purpose." (See Tr. 4/4/19, p.352, Ls.17-24.)
Evidence of Ms. Stone's character trait for peacefulness would have supported
Ms. Stone's theory of the case that she was kicking to try and get off the bed, and accidentally
made contact with Ms. Gonzales, while undermining the State's theory of the case that she
kicked Ms. Gonzales on purpose. Thus, because the evidence of character for peacefulness
spoke to the crucial issue of whether Ms. Stone had the requisite culpable state of mind, the State
cannot show there was no reasonable possibility that the district court's exclusion of that
evidence contributed to the conviction. See Sharp, 101 Idaho at 507. The State will be unable to
meet its burden of proving the district court's error in excluding the evidence on Ms. Stone's
character for peacefulness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Perry, 150 Idaho

at 227.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Stone respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district
court's judgment of conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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